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Abstract
In recent years, the level of detail in confidential data 
made available to social scientists has increased 
dramatically. One particularly important growth area 
has been ensuring that research outputs do not 
present any residual disclosure risk. Traditionally this 
has been managed by specifying rules for researchers 
(the ’rules-based’ model), but it is increasingly 
recognized that a ‘principles-based’ approach is both 
more secure and more cost-effective.
The principles-based approach requires a higher level 
of expertise from those managing access to data, 
and places the subjective assessment of risk at the 
forefront of decision-making; these two factors make 
data managers uncomfortable. In addition, knowledge 
of this approach is concentrated amongst a relatively 
small community, whereas 
the rules-based approach has 
dominated for half a century; 
data managers may not be aware 
of an alternative perspective.
This paper reviews the arguments 
for the two different approaches. 
They are not mutually exclusive: 
both take simple rules as 
a starting point, but the rules-based approach 
also finishes there. This has advantages in some 
circumstances, but the value of the principles-based 
approach increases with the sensitivity of the data and 
the scope of researchers to innovate.
The paper considers how the two approaches can be 
implemented. Although the principles-based model 
requires greater initial investment by both researchers 
and those managing access to data, this can bring 
substantial auxiliary benefits to the latter. The paper 
therefore concludes that a principles-based approach 
is generally preferable, and it is essential for the remote 
research data centres which dominate access solutions 
for the most sensitive data.
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Introduction  
Since the early 2000s, social scientists have seen an 
explosion in data availability. The most important 
has been the increasing research access to highly 
confidential but high utility data (see for example 
Trewin et al., (2007) or Elliot and Purdam, (2015) for a 
discussion of this trend). This has been made possible 
by the development of secure data access solutions. 
Principles- Versus Rules-
Based Output Statistical 
Disclosure Control 
In Remote Access 
Environments 
 by Felix Ritchie1 and Mark Elliot2
The main advantages of a rules-
based model is the certainty and lack 
of ambiguity
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These allow the managers of such facilities to control the data 
access process with a great deal of security, but researchers are 
no longer necessarily restricted to physically visiting the facility 
manager’s site; instead, they increasingly do so through remote 
access systems.
Some organisations have invested in secure remote job submission, 
where the researcher submits code to a server holding the 
data and receives back statistical results; for some data this is 
the most appropriate model, but for many types of data the 
dominant model is the remote research data centre (RRDC), 
where researchers access data through ‘thin clients’ (that is, where 
all the processing is done by the server holding the data, and 
the researcher controls the research through a web browser, for 
example). These allow researchers almost complete freedom to 
work with the data (other than removing them from the facility) 
and so are popular with researchers; they are also popular with 
data access managers, as such systems still allow a high level of 
control to be applied without the need for continual surveillance. 
A key element of that control is checking to ensure that statistical 
outputs do not present any residual disclosure risk: a researcher 
will use the data to produce statistical outputs, and it is possible 
that those outputs could inadvertently breach the confidentiality 
of the underlying data (for example, by revealing that only one 
person in a small area has a particular illness). A critical point here 
is that when a researcher publishes output they are effectively 
moving data (for output is still data) from a highly secure setting 
to a completely insecure one. The change in data environment, 
means that the status of the data can, in principle, change from 
non-personal to personal (see Mackey and Elliot, 2013, for a 
review ). Hence, disclosure checking of output is a vital part of the 
governance of secure data access systems.
Traditionally, ‘output statistical disclosure control’ (OSDC) has been 
managed by specifying rules for researchers to follow; for example, 
a requirement for all table cells to have at least three observations 
contributing to that cell. If the table meets the rules it can be 
released; if not, not. This ethos is reinforced by a half-century 
of statistical research focused on making tabular outputs safe 
(Hundepool et al., 2012).
However, in the last ten years it has become clear that simple 
models for tables have limited value in modern research 
environments, and increasingly common to discuss ‘output 
SDC’ as a separate research field3.   The complexity of outputs 
led some data managers (e.g. Ritchie, 2007) to argue that the 
rules-based approach was both unsafe and inefficient; instead, a 
‘principles-based’ approach could be both more secure and more 
cost-effective.
The principles-based approach uses rules to first-approximate a 
decision to release or not; but all preliminary decisions are subject 
to review and change if the researcher or the person responsbile 
for approving the release of output can make the case. The key is 
that both parties agree on the aims of the SDC process – and one 
of those aims can be to use the resources of the facility efficiently. 
The principles-based approach does not accept that outputs 
can be definitively classified as safe or not, only that the balance 
of probability says so. Finally, the principles-based approach 
acknowledges the value of research output in any decision. These 
differences may seem subtle, but they have profound implications 
for the way the facility and the researchers are managed.
The principles-based approach requires a higher level of expertise 
from the managers of research facilities, who must have both 
technical knowledge and an understanding of the research 
environment and researcher. In addition, it places the subjective 
assessment of risk at the forefront of decision-making. These two 
factors often make facility managers uncomfortable, as such 
organisations are typically risk-averse (Ritchie, 2014a). In addition, 
knowledge of the principles-based approach is concentrated 
amongst a relatively small community, whereas the rules-based 
model has been the dominant approach for half a century. Hence, 
facility managers may not be aware that there is an alternative 
perspective; if they are, they may not appreciate the subtleties of 
the principles-based approach, preferring instead a simpler model 
of data security (Ritchie and Welpton, 2014).
This paper aims to help facility managers make decisions about 
SDC, using the current best understanding of the pros and cons of 
each of the two process methodologies. For explanatory purposes, 
it uses the example of deciding on an approach to SDC for a 
remote RDC. This is because this is the case in which the difference 
between the two is starkest, and this paper demonstrates that 
the value of the principles-based approach increases with the 
sensitivity of the data and with the degree of freedom that 
researchers have to innovate. 
Our conclusion is that for remote RDCs the advantages of 
principles-based SDC are clear. Beyond this, there are also lessons 
for other environments. The two approaches are not mutually 
exclusive: both take simple rules as a starting point, but the rules-
based approach also finishes there. This has advantages in some 
circumstances (for example, rules-based is more appropriate for 
European Statistical System outputs; Eurostat, 2014), but as the 
principles-based approach is the generalisation of the rules-based 
approach, facility managers would do well to consider both.
The paper notes that, although the principles-based model 
requires greater initial investment by both the facility managers 
and the researchers, the necessary training can bring substantial 
auxiliary benefits to the facility manager. Put simply, the necessity 
to train researchers gives the facility manager an opportunity 
to encourage other positive behaviours, leading to increased 
‘legitimacy’ and improved researcher behaviour (Ritchie and 
Welpton, 2014). Again, this is not always feasible, which is why 
rules-based modelling is sometimes more appropriate. The aim of 
this paper is to show when these benefits can be realised.
The next section considers the definition, benefits and costs of the 
rules-based approach, whilst section three evaluates the principles-
based approach. Both consider the evidence for claims made. This 
is particularly important for the principles-based model, which 
brings risk-assessment to the fore. Section four summarises the 
dicussion, and concludes that the principles-based approach is 
essential for RDCs, whether remote or not. Section Five reviews 
implementation issues; Section Six concludes4.
Some definitions are necessary for the paper:
An ‘output’ in the context of this paper is any statistical product 
arising from use of the data, intended for distribution beyond the 
technical confines of the research facility. An output may be a table, 
graph, regression model, frequency count, survival function etc., or 
it may be a paper containing multiple statistical outputs. 
A ‘commentary’ in the context of this paper refers to any discussion 
about the analysis produced by the researcher. This includes 
written and verbal discussion.
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‘Statistical disclosure control’ (SDC) means techniques to ensure 
that a statistical product or data does not breach confidentiality 
guidelines. ‘Input SDC’ (often just referred to as SDC) is concerned 
with protection of data before researchers have access to it, and 
is the subject of a different paper. ‘Output-based SDC’ (OSDC) is 
only concerned with statistics for distribution, and is the focus of 
this paper.
‘Disclosive’ is used in this paper as a short-hand for ‘output 
which should not be made generally available as it retains a 
non-negligible residual risk that an individual population unit 
could be identified within them’; there might be variations in 
outputs between what is strictly unlawful and what is unwise 
and undesirable. For the purposes of exposition, we assume 
that disclosure equals a breach of confidentiality, with legal 
consequences and/or ethical implications.
The discussion below sits within the ‘five safes’5 framework (Desai et 
al. , 2014; see Camden, 2014, or Sullivan, 2011, for examples of use), 
which is a way of identifying sources of risk in data access: 
•	 Safe	projects	–	whether	the	data	use	is	lawful
•	 Safe	people	–	whether	the	researchers	can	be	trusted	to	hold	
and use the data appropriately
•	 Safe	settings	–	whether	the	manner	of	accessing	the	data	
offers protection
•	 Safe	data	–	whether	there	is	any	inherent	protection	in	
the data
•	 Safe	outputs	–	whether	the	outputs	from	the	research	pose	a	
disclosure risk
The final criterion recognises that, however well-intentioned 
and competent the researcher is, accidents can happen – either 
through ignorance or through complexity.
This paper only considers the ‘safe outputs’; that is, it is based on 
the assumption that data access is lawful and that researchers are 
not deliberately trying to misuse breach data confidentiality. How 
the researchers access the data is not relevant to this discussion.
Inherent protection in the data is mostly irrelevant to this 
discussion of general principles and procedures, (although it does 
have some bearing on training issues and rules-based approaches, 
to be discussed later). Therefore, this paper does not place any 
limits on the data used to generate these outputs. 
Rules-based OSDC
How it works
Rules-based OSDC consist of the application of a set of rules to 
determine whether an output should be released or not. Example 
rules might be
•	 “A	table	may	only	be	released	if	there	are	at	least	three	
observations for each cell”
•	 “A	regression	may	be	released	if	not	based	entirely	on	
categorical data”
•	 “A	Herfindahl	index	of	over	0.3	should	only	be	released	as	‘over	
0.3’”
•	 “Variance-covariance	matrices	X’X	may	not	be	released”
These are hard rules; they are expected to be applied consistently. 
This generates certainty in what output is acceptable, and allows 
machine-based SDC to be applied
Rules-based OSDC
Rules-based OSDC is simple and transparent. It is popular with 
data owners as it reflects the guidelines used to create official 
statistics, which are largely tabular. It is also necessary for the 
increasing number of automated systems which allow researchers 
to produce tables and analysis on the fly.
The main advantages of a rules-based model is the certainty 
and lack of ambiguity. This allows untrained (or partially trained) 
staff to clear outputs, and requires no training on the part of the 
researcher. Researchers can be given all the information they need 
in the form of hand-outs. This, for example, is how researchers at 
the Eurostat Safe Centre have been advised.
Criticisms of Rules based OSDC
There are three main disadvantages with the rules-based approach. 
All three are a consequence of the inevitable trade-off between 
confidentiality and efficiency problems. Consider devising a rule 
for the number of observations that have to be in a cell for it to 
be released:
•	 The	Confidentiality	Problem:	a	low	limit	increases	the	
probability of disclosive cells being published
•	 The	Efficiency	Problem:	a	high	limit	increases	the	probability	
of non-disclosive findings not being published
First, no rule can guarantee non-disclosure, and the application 
of strict rules can provide a false sense of security. For example, 
in some cases no amount of units in a cell prevents that cell 
breaching confidentiality in some way. Hence, the rules based 
approach may under-protect the data in some cases
Second, a rules-based approach tends to over-protect the data. 
Protection will tend to dominate user value: the rule is the only 
protection against disclosure, and hence has to be much stricter 
than if other factors (such as the specific data being tabulated) are 
taken into account. As well as being inefficient, this can also create 
credibility problems when expert users are asked to follow rules 
which do not make sense to them.
Third, rules cannot cover all conditions; new rules need to be 
devised and agreed as new possibilities occur. A proliferation 
of rules is possible and this can in turn lead to contradictions. 
Consider defining dominance rule for table cells of N units (that 
is, determining whether one or two units contribute so much 
to a cell total that the cell can be considered, for all practical 
purposes, to only include those units).  Rules that have been put 
forward include:
•	 the	top	unit	does	not	account	for	more	than	w%	of	the	total	
of the bottom N-2 records
•	 the	top	unit	does	not	account	for	more	than	x%	of	the	
cell total
•	 the	top	two	units	do	not	account	for	more	than	y%	of	the	
cell total
•	 the	Herfindahl	index	does	not	exceed	z%
Each rule identifies a potentially problematic distribution of data, 
but the rules will not necessarily agree.  Requiring all four rules to 
be met is over restrictive. Finally, unless the person clearing the 
output knows how the output was created, it is not possible solely 
from the output to determine whether the rules have been met 
or not.
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In summary, the simplicity of rules-based OSDC is also its main 
limitation, particularly when dealing with an expert user base  
when rules-based OSDC can suffer from credibility problems. The 
blunt instrument of rules-based OSDC can under-protect in some 
cases, but is more likely to over-protect. This can cause frustration 
in researchers, which in turn is one of the factors associated with 
confidentiality breaches (Desai and Ritchie, 2010).
Principles-based OSDC (PBOSDC)
How it works
Principles-based OSDC is characterised by:
•	 researchers	and	output	checkers	both	trained	in	SDC
•	 rules-of-thumb	rather	than	hard	rules
•	 freedom	to	approve	any	output	in	principle
•	 no	duty	to	release	any	output
•	 responsibility	for	producing	good	output	resting	with	
the researcher
•	 output	checkers	considering	the	value	of	the	output
•	 output	checkers	considering	resource	constraints
PBOSDC starts from the same perspective as a rules-based model: 
a set of rules exist to guide output approval. The difference is that 
these now become rules-of-thumb, rather than hard rules. They 
are there to guide the output-checker, but do not necessarily 
need to be followed. The output checker has complete freedom 
to exercise discretion, both to release an output and to decide 
not to release it. Clearance for release thus becomes a negotiation 
between researcher and approver. But an unrestricted negotiation 
is inefficient and so the rules-of-thumb provide the starting point.
It is important that both parties recognise the costs and the 
benefits of checking an output for clearance. Both parties want 
outputs to be processed quickly. The researchers want their 
outputs to be cleared; approvers want to be satisfied that the 
outputs are non-disclosive. A rejected output imposes costs on 
both parties; both parties therefore want to avoid this.
The key to POBSDC is that the person best able to assess whether 
an output should be released is the person who created it. The 
researcher knows whether the data was sampled, whether there 
are any dominance issues, how many observations there are in a 
cell, and so on. Most importantly, the researcher knows the value of 
the output to his or her research.
If the researcher knows the broad criteria on which output is 
checked he/she can ensure that (1) the output meets those criteria 
(2) the output checker has the information necessary to come 
to the same conclusion quickly and easily. If the output does not 
meet the prima facie conditions but is of high importance to the 
researcher, the researcher can try to persuade the output checker 
that this case is a valid exception to the rules-of-thumb. As this is 
likely to involve effort on both parties (and the output checker is 
under no obligation to concede the arguments), the researcher will 
have to consider whether the output is worth it. 
The final part of the system is that the outputs can be rejected 
not just on the basis of disclosiveness, but on the basis of whether 
they are a good use of the output checker’s time. It is irrelevant 
how much time the output checker actually has; the point of this 
rule is to allow the output checker to reward compliant behaviour 
and punish the malcontents by setting up appropriate incentives 
(Welpton and Ritchie, 2011, Ritchie and Welpton, 2012). 
Consider a (male) researcher wanting to produce a number of 
outputs which are (to his mind) non-disclosive, but nevertheless 
breach the rules-of-thumb. He has three alternatives
a. Send the outputs through and hope for the best
b. Not send the outputs through
c. Raise the issue with the output checker and try to identify a 
solution which works for both parties
Option (a) is often a good strategy as a one-off; output checkers 
should be tolerant of researchers periodically sending through 
output which requires more work to check. However, as a repeated 
strategy it risks aggravating the output checker who can delay or 
stop checking future outputs, particularly if the researcher shows a 
failure to understand the principles of clearance.
Option (b) is common in practice; researchers working in restricted 
environment typically produce a large amount of outputs, not 
all of which is wanted. As a general rule, PBOSDC aligns with 
good statistical practice; for example, in discouraging very low 
cell counts.
Option (c) is the most interesting one, and frequently used in 
restricted facilities using PBOSDC. Researchers learn that a ‘no 
surprises’ policy appeals to output checkers, who also want an 
efficient clearance process. This can lead to inventive solutions 
which work for both parties; for example, validating program code 
rather than outputs.
Hence, researchers are incentivised to produce good output, 
and are encouraged to talk to output checkers before problems 
arise. Output checkers are encouraged to promote good practice 
amongst researchers, and to listen to user perspectives on the 
value of certain outputs.
To be most efficient, a PBOSDC process should adopt the 
‘safe’/’unsafe’ statistics dichotomy (Ritchie, 2008; Brandt et al., 2010; 
Ritchie, 2014b). A ‘safe’ statistic is something which has very little 
or no inherent disclosure risk, such as regression coefficients.  An 
‘unsafe’ statistic is one which presumed to present a disclosure risk 
unless proved otherwise; for example, a simple tabulation. ‘Unsafe’ 
statistics, being ex ante disclosive, are much more time consuming 
to check.
Under PBOSDC, researchers can expect that ‘safe’ statistics will 
be cleared unless the output checker can demonstrate that it is 
disclosive; by definition, there will be almost no instances where 
this is the case. In contrast, ‘unsafe’ statistics will not be cleared 
unless the researcher can demonstrate that there is no disclosure 
risk. ‘Unsafe’ statistics passed for clearance impose a cost on the 
researcher related to the output checker’s cost of clearance. The 
researcher should  therefore be incentivised to concentrate on 
producing outputs made up of ‘safe’ statistics; and because the 
researcher is aware of how the value of specific outputs, there is an 
incentive to focus on important results and not large quantities of 
‘nice to have’ information. This dynamic needs to be emphasised in 
the service access training.
Finally, PBOSDC ideally attempts to raise awareness of speculating 
about the identity of records when commenting on results. For 
example, although a researcher may produce good statistical 
outputs, he or she might draw attention to the presence of a 
particular outlier which affects results. This cannot be dealt with by 
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a rules-based approach, but only by ensuring that researchers are 
aware of the risks posed by incautious discussions of data quality.
In summary, the aim of PBOSDC is to create an atmosphere where 
clearance is seen as the joint responsibility of researchers and 
output checkers. The common interest encourages the production 
of safe and useful outputs cleared by an efficient process.
However, for this to happen effectively, both need to understand 
the incentives of the other party, as well as the principles of 
SDC. Hence, there is a need for training of researchers and of 
output checkers. This is a major difference compared to the rules-
based approach.
Advantages of Principles based OSDC
The direct advantage of PBOSDC is that it should allow both more 
and safer outputs than the rules-based approach.  Consider again 
the potential errors noted above arising from a threshold rule, the 
confidentiality problem (too low a limit —> disclosive outputs) 
and the efficiency problem (too high a limit—>safe outputs 
rejected). Under PBOSDC, there is no conflict: a high limit, likely to 
remove almost all disclosure risk, is set as the initial rule of thumb. 
If a researcher feels that this is too high in a particular case, he or 
she can make that argument, confident that the arbitrary rule of 
thumb will be replaced by a review of the circumstances in the 
specific case.
This works because most researchers requiring access to detailed 
data want it for analytical purposes, which are more likely to be 
safe statistics. When unsafe statistics are the main focus of output 
(for example, the OECD commissioned work on high-growth 
companies which required very many tabulations from the 
VML), output checkers and researchers have an incentive to work 
together to agree in advance the range of permissible outputs.
The indirect advantage of PBOSDC is the ability to develop a 
culture of confidentiality awareness amongst researchers. This 
has positive feedback effects: a demonstrably educated and 
trustworthy researcher base can have systems designed to reflect 
that knowledge and trust, and a more appropriate working 
environment encourages positive behaviour from researchers 
(Desai and Ritchie, 2010; Ritchie and Welpton, 2014). This has been 
the pattern of development in UK Research Data Centres over the 
past decade.
Criticisms of Principles based OSDC
The three main criticisms of PBOSDC are uncertainty, inconsistency, 
and resource requirements.
PBOSDC, by design, introduces uncertainty into the process, as 
the whole ethos of PBOSDC is that decisions are taken in specific 
contexts. Training and ongoing engagement are therefore required 
to build trust.
If several output checkers are reviewing outputs, they may 
make different decisions; it is also possible that the same output 
checker will make apparently inconsistent decisions in different 
circumstances. This is because the checkers are making decisions 
responding to the particular circumstance of output, data and 
researcher and not just a rule about an output. To ameliorate this 
good training (of both researchers and output checkers) ensures 
that there will be agreement on the principles.  An important part 
of the process is that is that there is no rules-based yes/no answer; 
therefore output checkers should be aware that any decision 
necessarily has an element of subjective judgement and may need 
to be justified. 
It has been argued that the need for output checkers rather than 
automatic processes (or checking by staff with limited expertise) 
increase the costs of a facility, as does the explicit allowance for 
researchers to challenge decisions. While this has not been the 
case to date in facilities where PBOSDC is fully implemented, it is 
clear that some expenditure on training for staff and researchers is 
necessary; when one facility failed to train its new staff, there was 
an immediate impact on clearance rates and quality.
PBOSDC in practice
In practice, none of the criticisms suggested in the previous 
section have proved significant. The evidence for this comes from 
the eight years of PBOSDC at the Virtual Microdata Laboratory 
(VML) at the UK Office for National Statistics, where the process 
was developed, as well as more recent experience at SDS and 
HMRC Data Lab, also in the UK6 .
Uncertainty does exist. However, there should be no uncertainty 
about the process or the criteria for deciding whether to release 
an output or not. The purpose of researcher training is to help 
researchers understand the uncertainty and manage it. Researchers 
have made mistakes, and while these are mostly oversights on 
the part of the researchers, a small number are due to researchers 
not understanding the principles of SDC. In general these were 
dealt with by discussion with the researchers, explaining the error. 
Recidivism rates were negligible, but a very small number of VML 
researchers were asked to re-attend training (less than five people 
in seven years, out of over eight hundred trained researchers). 
Although there are no figures, the number of requests for output 
refused	at	the	VML	was	believed	to	be	around	5%.
Inconsistency exists but there is little evidence to date of it being 
significant. Over seven years around twenty output checkers 
were employed at ONS; periodic checks were carried out, and 
although output checkers showed some slight variance, there was 
no practical difference in outcomes. It was discovered that one 
output checker was seen as ‘softer’ by some researchers, but even 
those outputs were well within the safety margin. In one case, a 
researcher’s output was seen by five output checkers (including 
the ‘soft’ checker), all of whom independently gave the same 
opinion. So whilst differences do exist, in practice these have no 
notable impact.
If the research facility is not centrally run, or if several facilities are 
trying to co-ordinate SDC policies, there is another level at which 
variance may happen: between centres. There may be some 
cultural variability and the potential for local ethos to develop 
should be acknowledged and monitored. A common training 
framework where the principles of SDC are gone into in some 
depth,	practice	sharing	between	centres,	“test”	submissions	and	
cross-centre case study reviews can help to mitigate this.
The reason inconsistency and uncertainty have not been major 
problems to date is because of the built-in safety margins. As 
noted above, ignoring the Efficiency Problem means that the 
rules of thumb to address the Confidentiality Problem can be 
made much stricter; a confidentiality breach therefore requires a 
considerable error by both researchers and output checkers. 
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This margin of error is also at the heart of the efficiency of the 
process. Output checkers can clear large amounts of output 
because they have confidence in the extra-safe rules-of-thumb for 
“unsafe	statistics”,	and	because	“safe	statistics”	require	little	scrutiny.	
At its peak the VML was dealing with 2500 clearance requests a 
year, or roughly ten every working day; one person was allocated 
to be output checker for that day, and the target was that this 
should take no more than half an hour, a target generally achieved. 
As a ‘clearance request’ typically consisted of several regressions, 
a couple of descriptive tables (and in one case over fifty graphs), 
and/or a log file, the actual number of statistical outputs being 
checked was much more than ten per day.
This work rate was maintained by emphasising the researcher’s 
role in clearance. For example, the VML output checkers had 
an informal policy of clearing the easiest outputs first; this was 
communicated to researchers at training sessions. This gave 
researchers an incentive to build up a reputation of producing 
‘good’ (i.e. easy to check) outputs. 
Finally, there is evidence that the training sessions (and the 
relationship built up between researchers and output checkers) 
do foster a culture of confidentiality awareness, with examples 
of researchers being self-policing. It is unlikely that academics 
using the VML, SDS and HMRC Data Lab would see themselves 
as being particularly SDC aware, as this is their only experience 
of it7. Nevertheless, a comparison with users of facilities in other 
countries shows that the UK academia is much better informed. 
This is why the UK model of researcher training was adopted 
largely unchanged by Eurostat as recommended best practice 
Rules-based Principles-based
Complex No Generally not – rules-of-thumb usually 
sufficient
Flexible No Yes
Transparent Yes Yes, if output checkers record factors 
leading to  exceptional judgment
Consistent Yes Generally, but scope for minor variations
Secure Limited by 
efficiency
Yes - able to handle lower and higher risk 
cases
Efficiency Limited by 
security
Yes - tailored to circumstances
Risk management Yes/no model Explicit ’balance-of-risks’ model
Sensitive to context No Yes
Sensitive to user needs No Yes
Suitable for automation Yes Only as initial gatekeeper – humans are 
final arbiters
Requires researcher training No Yes
Requires researcher engagement No Yes
Requires co-ordination of output 
checkers
No Yes
Cost Low High initial cost, low or negative ongoing 
costs
1
(Brandt et al., 2010), and why researcher training should be seen as 
an investment rather than an expense.
Rules-based versus principles-based OSDC
The various aspects of the two approaches can be summarised 
as follows.
Although described above as alternatives, there is a relationship 
between rules-based and principles-based output SDC. The rules 
act as the starting point for PBOSDC output checking (see Brandt 
et al., 2010). However, there are two crucial differences:
•	 In	PBOSDC,	the	rules	are	‘rules-of-thumb’	–	explicitly	ad	
hoc, and amenable to adjustment, up or down, depending 
on circumstances.
•	 these	rules	of	thumb	can	then	be	more	restrictive	as	
prima facie efficiency has a low priority in the setting of the 
default values.
For ‘safe statistics’ the ‘hard rules’ and ‘rules-of-thumb’ are the same; 
by definition, ‘safe statistics’ are those which are amenable to the 
identification of simple yes/no cases (Ritchie, 2008). Ultimately, 
PBOSDC takes rules-based SDC as a good first-order approximation, 
but gives expertise and experience the final decision. For this 
reason it is the recommended approach 
for the RDCs. In situations where facility 
managers have less opportunity to manage 
researchers’ activities and outputs, PBOSDC 
may be harder to implement, as the active 
engagement of researchers is essential. 
Implementing PBOSDC
Conceptual development
The most detailed expression of PBOSDC 
is the Eurostat-approved guidelines of 
Brandt et al. (2010). These were derived 
almost entirely from the VML rules, with 
the exception of the dominance rules. 
Since the publication of the Eurostat 
guidelines there have been a number of 
minor developments. For example,  on 
regression, several authors (e.g. Reznek 
and Riggs, 2005; Ronning, 2011; Bleninger 
et al., 2011) have investigated options for 
deliberately creating misleading regression 
results, and US and Australian works have 
studied regression models in remote-
execution systems. Ritchie (2012, 2014b) 
incorporates most of these results, but 
new queries appear (for example, on the 
tabulation of binary variables, and how 
single-observation categories are treated in 
regressions) In addition, not all UK work (for 
example, on variance-covariance matrices) 
was adopted as it was felt to be too obscure 
for a general document. 
None of these are major challenges but they highlight the need 
for updating the current state of knowledge and communicating 
this to facility managers and researchers. When the VML guide 
to SDC was the only source and was owned by the VML team, 
updating was straightforward. One of the negative consequences 
of the wider use of the PBOSDC approach is that there is no 
clear mechanism for maintaining and disseminating knowledge. 
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Facilities wishing to implement PBOSDC may therefore need 
to collaborate with other facilities to ensure that a consistent 
approach can be developed and applied8. 
It has been suggested that the theoretical basis for PBOSDC 
and the safe/unsafe statistics model does not provide sufficient 
reassurance to potential data suppliers. In addition, theoretical 
models may miss some plausible outcomes (that is, those likely to 
occur in practice) arising from, for example, naïve researchers. 
One solution is to set up an ‘ethical hacking’ mechanism to probe 
both genuine and fake outputs to test what information could be 
acquired. A second would be to have periodic audits of outputs 
from the facility by a competent body, perhaps another facility. 
This has the added advantage of encouraging consistency across 
facilities. 
Need for training
Researcher training is essential for PBOSDC. Untrained researchers 
cannot be expected to know the basis of SDC, and the training 
itself should be used to develop an affinity between the 
researchers and the facility. There are several PBOSDC training 
manuals/presentations which can be drawn upon and updated. 
This training could be part of any user accreditation process.
There is already significant training experience in the UK and other 
countries, and therefore any facility would not need to start from 
scratch. However, as one of the key elements is to encourage 
researcher engagement, training needs to be sensitive to the 
needs and indeed interests of the researcher community; what 
may appeal to Mexican researchers may be different from the 
expectation of Norwegians. Training also needs to be sensitive 
to the data. Much of the extant training focuses on social 
and business survey data, which are of more limited risk, but 
administrative data brings additional problems (data may be a 
census; health data is typically more prone to outliers and retains 
its sensitivity over time). This is particularly important if tables are 
likely to comprise a lot of the outputs.
Finally, there is the need to train and update the knowledge of 
output checkers. Periodic peer review has proved useful in the 
past. Discussion forums allow knowledge to be shared, discussed 
and updated across facilities. If made available to researchers, these 
would also have value for researchers, although not necessarily 
in the same detail and with a full range of views expressed. One 
option would be to set up a discussion forum for facility staff, with 
a summary/FAQ page for researchers. 
Trusted researchers
One decision to be made is whether some researchers could 
have different rules applied. Either particular types of people (e.g. 
full professors) or those who have built up reputations with the 
output checkers could have fewer checks imposed on them. The 
argument is that the burden for output checking is unnecessary, 
and creates ill-will amongst senior researchers who have proven 
their expertise. Some facilities do use such differentiated models.
In practice, these arguments do not hold. Seniority is no guarantee 
of good practice. Indeed the opposite can be true; experience 
shows that junior staff are more enthusiastic adopters of safe 
practices. Similarly, familiarity may make mistakes less likely but 
does not eliminate them. As mistakes are far and away the most 
likely reason for failed clearances, long-term usage does not seem 
sufficient cause on its own to remove checks.
These arguments are also based on the assumption that all outputs 
are equal. As should be clear from the discussion above, over time 
researchers should develop a sense of what is and is not allowed, 
and tailor their outputs accordingly. In other words, the PBOSDC 
encourages the development of expertise in output assessment by 
all parties, and thus efficient exchanges. There is no need to create 
an artificial group of ‘good’ researchers; besides, creating ‘classes’ of 
users could discourage knowledge and experience sharing.
Malevolent researchers
Any output disclosure control system will have additional 
difficulties with a user who deliberately sets out to breach the 
system. PBOSDC assumes that researchers are well-intentioned 
and interested in generating good statistical outputs. It may be 
possible to spot unauthorised outputs, but in practice a user set 
on breaching procedures would be able to disguise inappropriate 
outputs (for example by burying discovered data in complex 
model output). It should be noted that all the data used in current 
training programmes for controlled environments is wholly 
invented, yet plausible.
The success of PBOSDC therefore depends upon the ‘safe 
people’/’safe project’ dimensions of the Five Safes model. That said, 
at present, there are no known examples of academic researchers 
maliciously breaching confidentiality rules. There are numerous 
examples of well-intentioned researchers making mistakes, and 
a smaller number of cases of researchers deliberately ignoring 
procedures to make life easier for themselves (but again, without 
intending to disclose confidential data).
Setting up a system which would stand a chance of picking up 
malicious attacks therefore has no realistic prospect of success, 
and would increase greatly costs and clearance time. If a facility 
believed that malicious attack was a significant risk, then 
examining user logs and codes would be a more useful place to 
look for malpractice – and would also be necessary for forensic 
evidence in the event of a disciplinary event. 
In summary, PBOSDC cannot stop ill-intentioned researchers; it is 
designed to deal with cases of accidental rule breaking and errors. 
If malicious attack is felt to be a problem, then this should be 
tackled at the ‘people’ level9.
Multi-stage clearance
The UK VML operated a two stage-clearance procedure: 
‘intermediate’ outputs could be released to researchers who 
could work on the further analysis at their home institution. 
‘final clearance’ was given when papers were ready for general 
distribution. The UK Secure Data Service only allowed ‘final 
clearance’: papers are fully prepared within the SDS virtual facility.
These two choices reflect physical differences. The VML involved 
travel to a specific location; it was not thought to be a good use 
of restricted facilities to have researchers editing papers, and the 
opportunity to discuss results with co-researchers was limited. In 
the SDS these two issues are less important.
Note however that VML applied full PBOSDC at the intermediate 
stage; the assumption was that once an output had left the VML’s 
control it could end up in the wild however well-intentioned 
the researcher. This assumption turned out to be correct, even if 
unsanctioned releases were rare. The VML’s ‘final clearance’ stage 
imposed a level of super-checking on outputs – asking researchers 
to limit outputs to the minimum necessary (compared to the 
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intermediate stage were multiple variants might be tried). As this 
reflected the research stages (exploratory work, produce many 
outputs, refine, and then publish) the model worked.
The two-stage model did introduce an extra layer of administration, 
as now both intermediate and final clearances had to be checked 
and recorded. However, it did speed up the intermediate level 
clearance, as VML staff knew that if they made a mistake they had 
a ‘second chance’ to address it. This increased the already-wide 
margin for error in the VML PBOSDC procedures.
Given that researchers were only bound by VML procedures 
(and not required by law) not to publish intermediate outputs, 
the	100%	co-operation	(allowing	for	mistakes)	can	be	seen	as	a	
positive reflection of how researchers respond to appropriate 
training. However, the VML did make researchers aware that failure 
to follow procedures would affect the way that future access to 
data was viewed. This may have had more of an effect, and may be 
of relevance to a facility choosing to adopt two-stage clearance.  
Allowing intermediate output out implies increasing risk 
unless	adequate	mitigation	is	in	place.	Relying	100%	on	trust	of	
researchers without any bounds implies allowing unmeasurable 
variations in risk and therefore is not sufficient to provide that 
mitigation. Appropriate risk mitigation implies processes such as:
•	 Secondary	licensing	agreements.	
•	 Minimum	required	security	arrangements	for	
intermediate output.
•	 Specified	lists	of	persons	who	will	have	access	to	the	
intermediate outputs. 
•	 Occasional	random	audits.
Summary
This paper recommends PBOSDC be adopted for use in RDCs, 
whether physical or remote. The reasons for this are twofold 
(i) principles based SDC can produce output that is of higher 
quality at the same or lower level of risk; and (ii) the opportunity 
of building a relationship with researchers can generate multiple 
benefits. In short, PBOSDC is both safer and more efficient that 
rules-based approaches and it encourages the development of a 
culture of expertise in confidentiality.
There are already guides and training programmes boasting 
several years’ experience of PBOSDC. A facility wanting to adopt 
PBOSDC can build upon these, perhaps tailoring them more to 
its particular researcher group and data. PBOSDC needs to be 
integrated into a training programme; it assumes that researchers 
are well-intentioned (if liable to make occasional mistakes). There 
also needs to be a mechanism to ensure consistency across 
checkers (and possibility sites). The facility may also want to invest 
some resources in ethical hacking to provide extra reassurance 
to data owners. Finally, the facility needs to determine whether it 
wants a one- or two-stage clearance process. While PBOSDC at the 
point the output leaves the restricted facility can be the same, the 
perceived and actual security differs.
For non-RDC environments, the case for PBOSDC is less clear. 
For example, if researchers’ only sensible interaction with the 
facility manager is receiving a partially anonymised file on CD 
plus guidelines for publishing safe statistics, then a rules-based 
approach may be simpler. However we would recommend that 
even a discussion of rules should be placed in the context of the 
principles of SDC: in general, the support officer is more welcomed 
than the policeman.
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notes
1. Corresponding author: Felix Ritchie, Bristol Business School, 
University of the West of England Bristol, Coldharbour Lane, Bristol 
BS16 1QY. Email: felix.ritchie@uwe.ac.uk.
2.  Mark Elliot, School of Social Sciences and Data Research Institute, 
University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL. Email: 
mark.elliot@manchester.ac.uk
3.  There is a large literature on statistical disclosure risk assessment 
and control methods. We do not discuss this in detail as here we are 
talking about two top-level process methodologies rather than the 
specifics of individual technical methods. We would direct the reader 
who is interested in the detail to recent comprehensive field reviews 
(Duncan et al. 2011 and Hundepool et al. 2012)
4.  A more extended discussion of this argument is available in Ritchie 
(2007).
5..	It	is	important	to	stress	that	“safe”	is	used	here	not	in	its	absolute	
postpositive sense (free from danger or risk) but in its relative sense 
(the degree to which a solution affords security or protection from 
risk); see Ritchie (2014b, section 5).
6.  PBOSDC is also used at other restricted facilities in Mexico, Germany 
and the Netherlands, as well as informally in other countries.
7.  An exception is medical sciences where data protection has had a 
much higher profile, and researchers in all countries tend to have a 
greater awareness of confidentiality issues.
8.  In January 2015, all the UK RRDCs initiated a working group on SDC; 
one of the group’s functions is to determine how guidelines can be 
effectively maintained, distributed and updated.
9.  Note that rules-based OSDC is even more susceptible to malicious 
attacks, as the yes/no approval process means that anything that 
looks acceptable will be approved without further checking.
